William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 1

2011

Revisiting Search Engine Bias
Eric Goldman

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Goldman, Eric (2011) "Revisiting Search Engine Bias," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article 14.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Article 14

Goldman: Revisiting Search Engine Bias

REVISITING SEARCH ENGINE BIAS
Eric Goldman †
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 96
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS .................. 97
A. Google Rolled Up the Keyword Search Market but Faces
Other New Competitors ........................................................ 97
B. Google’s Search Results Page Has Gotten More
Complicated ...................................................................... 102
C. Google’s Portalization ........................................................ 103
D. “Net Neutrality” and “Search Neutrality” ........................... 105
III. THE END OF RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT SEARCH
ENGINE BIAS........................................................................... 107
I.

INTRODUCTION

Questions about search engine bias have percolated in the
academic literature for over a decade. In the past few years, the
issue has evolved from a quiet academic debate to a full blown
regulatory and litigation frenzy. At the center of this maelstrom is
Google, the dominant market player.
This Essay looks at changes in the industry and political
environment over the past half-dozen years that have contributed
1
to the current situation, and supplements my prior contribution to
† Associate Professor and Director, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara
University School of Law.
Email: egoldman@gmail.com.
Website:
http://www.ericgoldman.org. It would be challenging to disclose all of my
interactions with Google, but here are a few key ones: I use Google products and
services heavily; I am a Google AdSense publisher, although my earnings are
meager; and I co-authored an amicus brief (on behalf of numerous law professors)
in support of Google’s legal position in the Second Circuit Rescuecom Corp. v. Google
appeal. 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). However, I have not acted as an attorney, a
consultant, or an expert for Google.
1. As I did in my original essay, I focus only on the United States. Related
issues are raging in Europe due to a pending European Union (EU) investigation
of Google’s organic and paid advertisement search results. See James Kanter,
Europe Inquiry Focuses on Google Business Practice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2011),
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the literature, a 2006 essay entitled Search Engine Bias and the Demise
2
of Search Engine Utopianism.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST HALF-DOZEN YEARS
This section highlights four major developments to the search
engine industry over the past half-dozen years:
(1) Google has dominated the search engine industry but faces
emerging competition from entities that are not traditional
search engines.
(2) Google has changed its search results pages substantially.
(3) Google has expanded its proprietary service offerings, which it
promotes on its search results pages.
(4) The emergence of Net Neutrality as a policy issue has spurred
consideration of a “Search Neutrality” analogue.
A. Google Rolled Up the Keyword Search Market but Faces Other New
Competitors
In the past half-dozen years, Google has largely rolled up the
U.S. keyword search industry—both organic search as well as
keyword advertising. Google now has a dominant position in both
markets. In 2006, it was clear that Google would thrive, but it was
less clear that no major new competitors would successfully
challenge Google’s dominance in the high-margin multi-billion
dollar industry.
At the time, the industry had four major search engines—
3
Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Ask —and several promising startup efforts. Since then, Ask (a perennial also-ran) stopped
4
maintaining a search index, and Yahoo stopped generating its own
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/technology/14google.html. The United
States and EU differ in a number of important respects, including Google’s
market share (in some EU countries, Google has over ninety percent market
share), Europe’s comparatively pro-regulatory approach, and the United States’
regulatory restrictions, such as the Constitution and the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2010). Due to these differences, search engine
developments in Europe may not provide good insights into U.S. policy.
2. Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism,
8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=893892.
3. See Gavin O’Malley, Google Top Search Engine in November, Per Hitwise,
MEDIAPOST NEWS (Dec. 12, 2007, 7:00 AM), http://www.mediapost.com
/publications/article/72553.
4. Danny Sullivan, Ask.com to Focus on Q&A Search, End Web Crawling, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://searchengineland.com/ask-com-tofocus-on-qa-search-end-web-crawling-55209.
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search index and outsourced that operation to Microsoft,
6
although Yahoo still retains control over the results presentation.
Other new entrants have emerged from time to time, but none of
them have garnered a meaningful audience.
Given these developments, effectively, the organic search
results market now has just two major competitors—Google and
Microsoft—and Google dominates the field.
Microsoft has
contested Google’s stronghold through an advertising campaign
7
valued at up to $100 million, but it has picked up only a few
8
Even in the keyword
percentage points of market share.
advertising market—which Yahoo, Microsoft, and numerous other
players continue to contest fiercely—Google remains the dominant
9
player.
It remains unclear why the organic search industry has
consolidated so much or what is the socially optimal number of
competitors. Possibilities include:
• Running an industry-competitive search engine is really
expensive. Yahoo expected to save $200 million a year by
10
outsourcing its search operations to Microsoft.
• Search indexes may have economies of scale. In justifying its
deal with Yahoo, Microsoft argued that having higher volumes
5. Shashi Seth, Yahoo! Transitions Organic Search Back-End to Microsoft Platform,
YAHOO! SEARCH BLOG (Aug. 24, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://
www.ysearchblog.com/2010/08/24/yahoo-transitions-organic-search-back-end-tomicrosoft-platform.
6. Id.
7. Abbey Klaassen, Microsoft Aims Big Guns at Google, Asks Consumers to Rethink
Search, ADAGEDIGITAL (May 25, 2009), http://adage.com/digital
/article?article_id=136847.
8. See, e.g., Top U.S. Search Sites for July 2010, NIELSEN WIRE (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/top-us-search-sites-for-july2010 (showing Bing as having gone from 9% to 13.6% of market share, mostly at
the expense of Yahoo instead of Google). See generally Greg Sterling, Bing’s Battle
with Google: How Long Is “Long Term”?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Aug. 2, 2011, 11:17
AM), http://searchengineland.com/bings-battle-with-google-how-long-is
-long-term-87823 (wondering how Microsoft measures Bing’s success and what
happens if Bing continues to be an also-ran). Note that due to methodological
differences, different vendors disagree on the exact market share of the various
players, but all agree that Google has a supermajority of the organic search
market.
9. Jack Marshall, U.S. Search Ad Spending Sees Strong Growth, CLICKZ NEWS
(Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1937903/search-spendingstrong-growth (stating Google’s share of search ad spending in quarter four of
2010 was 78.6%).
10. Steve Ballmer & Carol Bartz: Microsoft-Yahoo! Search Agreement, MICROSOFT
NEWS CENTER (July 29, 2009), http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec
/steve/2009/07-29search.mspx.
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of search queries helps a search engine improve its search
11
results.
• Google is not playing fair. Google has encountered increased
12
13
antitrust scrutiny from U.S. government agencies, Congress,
14
15
the Texas attorney general, and private litigants.
Another possibility is that “keyword search” conceives the
market too narrowly. While Google has dominated its direct
competition in the search market, Google faces serious new
11. See, e.g., Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust
Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search
Advertising Agreement Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-at163.html. But see Tom Krazit, Google’s Varian: Search Scale is ‘Bogus’, CNET NEWS
(Aug. 14, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-10309375265.html, for an interview with Google’s chief economist, Hal Varian.
12. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are
constantly reviewing many of Google’s activities, including its aborted search
advertising outsourcing deal with Yahoo; a purported agreement with Silicon
Valley companies to restrict employee poaching; its board interlocks with Apple;
its Book Search settlement; and its acquisitions of DoubleClick, Admob, and ITA.
See, e.g., Thomas Claburn, Google Defends Itself Against Antitrust Regulation,
INFOMATIONWEEK (June 11, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://www.informationweek.com
/news/internet/google/217800685; Brad Stone, Sure, It’s Big. But Is That Bad?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23
/technology/23goog.html. As of August 2011, the FTC continues to consider a
wide-ranging investigation against Google. Thomas Catan & Amir Efrati, FTC
Sharpens Google Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10001424053111904823804576500544082214566.html.
13. Declan McCullagh, FTC, Senate Ratchet up Google Antitrust Probes, CNET
NEWS (June 23, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20073689281/ftc-senate-rachet-up-google-antitrust-probes.
14. Don Harrison, Texas Inquires on Our Approach to Competition, GOOGLE PUB.
POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com
/2010/09/texas-inquires-on-our-approach-to.html. As of August 2011, Wisconsin
and Ohio were also considering Google’s practices. Sara Forden & Brian
Womack, Google Said to Face Possible Antitrust Probes in Ohio, Wisconsin, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 24, 2011, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-24/googlesaid-to-face-possible-antitrust-probes-by-ohio-wisconsin-officials.html.
15. In particular, Google has recently faced two antitrust lawsuits from two
“vertical” search engines, TradeComet and myTriggers, both complaining that
Google marginalized their visibility to reduce competition. See TradeComet.com
LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing on
jurisdictional grounds), aff’d 2011 No. 10–911–cv, WL 3100388 (2d Cir. July 26,
2011); BFS Fin. v. MyTriggers Co., No. 09CV-14836 (Franklin Cnty. Ct. C.P. Aug.
31, 2011); see also Seth Hettena, The Google-Slayers, AM. LAWYER, May 1, 2010, at 13
(exploring the possible relationships between the lawsuits). Google has faced
other antitrust challenges previously, including the Person, KinderStart, and
Langdon lawsuits. See Person v. Google, Inc., 346 F. App’x. 230 (9th Cir. 2009);
Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); KinderStart.com
LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF, 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. March 16,
2007).
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competitive threats we did not anticipate in 2006. For example,
both Facebook and Twitter have emerged as partial alternatives to
Google keyword searching.
Twitter does a huge volume of searches on its real-time
16
database. Indeed, recognizing Twitter’s success at addressing realtime informational needs, for several years, Google licensed
17
Twitter’s real-time content and made Twitter results more
18
prominent on Google’s search results pages.
Facebook does not directly compete with Google for keyword
searches, but Facebook has emerged as a crucial competitor
nonetheless. First, Facebook competes with Google for user
19
mindshare. As Facebook captures more user time and attention,
these users will utilize Google less. Further, as users experiment
with finding information through their social network, Google’s
20
keyword searching may become a less important resource.
16. Kim-Mai Cutler, Twitter Search Queries Up 33 Percent from April to 800 Million
per Day, SOCIALBEAT (July 6, 2010), http://social.venturebeat.com/2010/07/06
/twitter-search-800-million-queries.
17. Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, 2 Deals Hint at Revenue for Twitter, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/technology
/internet/22twitter.html.
18. Amit Singhal, Relevance Meets the Real-Time Web, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE
BLOG (Dec. 7, 2009, 11:31 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/12
/relevance-meets-real-time-web.html. Google subsequently created a stand-alone
page for searching just real-time content. Claire Cain Miller, Google Gives Real-Time
Search Its Own Page, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Aug. 26, 2010, 2:21 PM), http://bits.blogs
.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/google-gives-real-time-search-its-own-page. After the
Google-Twitter license expired, Google replaced Twitter’s content with posts from
Google+. Clint Boulton, Google+ Posts Now Indexed on Google Search Results,
EWEEK.COM (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Search-Engines
/Google-Posts-Now-Indexed-on-Google-Search-Results-745427. This indicates the
importance of real-time content to Google, as well as the possible competitive
substitutability between Twitter and Google.
19. Ylan Q. Mui & Peter Whoriskey, Facebook Passes Google as Most Popular Site
on the Internet, Two Measures Show, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR201012
3004645.html (noting that Facebook surpassed Google, becoming the most
popular website on the Internet); Greg Sterling, Facebook Passes Google in “Time
Spent,” What Does It Mean?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 10, 2010, 9:30 AM),
http://searchengineland.com/facebook-passes-google-in-time-spent-who-shouldcare-50263 (discussing that web searchers spend more time on Facebook than on
Google).
20. See, e.g., Chris Crum, Facebook Finding More Ways to Compete with Google,
WEBPRONEWS (May 10, 2010, 8:40 AM), http://www.webpronews.com/facebookfinding-more-ways-to-compete-with-google-2010-05 (portraying Facebook as a
growing presence for web searchers); Mike Masnick, Anyone Notice That Sites Don’t
Have to Rely on Google So Much for Traffic Any More?, TECHDIRT (Dec. 23, 2010, 7:39
PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101223/14325412399/anyone-noticethat-sites-dont-have-to-rely-google-so-much-traffic-any-more.shtml (positing that
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The emergence of Twitter and Facebook as possible substitutes
for Google search demonstrates two key points about Internet
competition generally. First, if we evaluate Internet competition
only by taking a point-in-time snapshot of existing competitors, we
will probably fail to anticipate the identity and business proposition
of disruptive new entrants. Second, in a digital environment with
low switching costs between vendors, consumers will flock to new
entrants that solve their informational needs—even if the
competitors offer a very different solution. As a result, a dominant
information provider in one technological niche still faces
significant cross-elasticity of demand from providers in other
technological niches.
With respect to search engine bias, a dominant search engine
is potentially disconcerting. I previously argued that consumers
21
would migrate to or from search engines based on relevancy; but
if consumers do not have meaningful choices, search engine bias
could create serious issues for online information credibility and
accessibility. At the same time, the past half-dozen years have
shown that competition from indirect competitors (who serve
consumers’ informational needs, even if they use different
methodologies) can and do keep problematic search engine bias in
check by creating meaningful alternatives for consumers.
Because Google has emerged as the dominant search engine,
much of the “search engine bias” discussion has merged with a
critique of Google’s biased practices. We will revisit this merging
later; but for now, this Essay focuses on Google’s practices because
they are often considered coextensive with the search engine
22
industry.

web searchers use multiple websites besides Google for their web browsing needs);
Michael S. Rosenwald, How You and Google are Losing the Battle Against Spam in
Search Results, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012803849.html (noting that web
bloggers are criticizing Google for succumbing to spam advertising); Greg
Sterling, Facebook Passes Google: What Does It Mean?, SCREENWERK (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://www.screenwerk.com/2010/03/16
/facebook-passes-google-what-might-it-mean.
21. Goldman, supra note 2, at 197 (noting that web searchers shop around
between various search engines if they do not find what they are looking for).
22. Cf. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of
Antitrust: The Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171,
218 (2011) (discussing the extent to which Google has a monopoly within its
industry).
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B. Google’s Search Results Page Has Gotten More Complicated
In 2006, most Google search results pages had two primary
23
zones: organic search results and keyword ads. Because the first
24
search result page gets the vast majority of clicks, in practice,
everyone was trying to squeeze into a very limited space: the top ten
organic search results (of which only the top few really matter
traffic-wise) and a small number of advertising spots.
Google’s ad spots on search results pages have not materially
25
changed, but the organic search results have become much more
complicated. Instead of a single set of ten organic results, Google
now often shows numerous “zones” of search results on a single
search results page. These include traditional organic search
results, local results, news results, shopping results, video results,
highlighted brands, results from sites in the searcher’s social
26
network, a map for geographic results, and more.
Marketers now seek to show up favorably in each subzone. For
example, if the local results zone appears after the third organic
result, the first local result might generate more traffic than the
fourth organic search result. Consequently, being the first organic
search result remains commercially valuable, but it is no longer as
crucial as it used to be. In effect, Google’s search results now
create multiple tournaments with multiple winners, thus
supplanting the single winner-take-all tournament that prevailed in
2006. The proliferation of results zones increases the number of
zones where search results bias might occur, but bias within each
zone may be less crucial than in the past.

23. Cf. Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1342 (2008)
(discussing the left and right columns, representing organic results and keyword
ads, respectively).
24. See Goldman, supra note 2.
25. Their positioning has not materially changed, and Google has made
various small refinements in their presentation. Perhaps the biggest change is that
Google stopped using the term “sponsored links” and now calls the ads “ads.” E.g.,
Barry Schwartz, Google Does Away with “Sponsored Links” Label, Now Ads Are Labeled
“Ads,” SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 5, 2010, 3:06 PM), http://searchengineland
.com/google-does-away-with-sponsored-links-label-now-ads-are-labeled-ads-54956.
26. This is part of Google’s “universal search” initiative. See Google Begins Move
to Universal Search, GOOGLE (May 16, 2007), http://www.google.com/intl/en
/press/pressrel/universalsearch_20070516.html (noting Google’s plans to deliver
a comprehensive search experience); Danny Sullivan, Google 2.0: Google Universal
Search, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (May 16, 2007, 2:33 PM), http://
searchengineland.com/google-20-google-universal-search-11232 (discussing the
new features of Google’s universal search).
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27

For the first several years of Google’s existence, Google sought
28
to move users off its site to third-party sites as quickly as possible.
Google’s stated goal was to figure out what consumers wanted and
29
get them to their desired destination fast.
The “I’m Feeling Lucky” button (still on Google’s home page)
exemplified this philosophy. Google says, “[a]n ‘I’m Feeling
TM
Lucky ’ search means you spend less time searching for web pages
30
and more time looking at them” —even if getting searchers off the
31
site quickly costs Google money.
Over the past half-dozen years, Google’s priorities have
changed in two ways. First, Google now attempts to answer many
types of queries—including weather predictions, flight tracking,
currency conversion, package tracking, stock quotes, sports scores,
32
movie times, and health information —directly on the search
results page above other organic results, without the searcher
needing to click on any search results or go to any third-party
websites. As a result, where Google used to send searchers to thirdparty websites for these factual queries, Google increasingly keeps
33
the searchers on Google’s own pages. This implicitly puts Google
in competition with third-party websites that would derive
27. See Eric Goldman, The Portalization of Google, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(Mar. 27, 2005, 12:17 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/03
/the_portalizati.htm (noting that Google-sourced content generally accompanies
search results).
28. See Eric Goldman, Portalization of Google, Redux, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010
/09/portalization_o.htm (quoting Our Philosophy, WAYBACKMACHINE (June 3,
2004, 2:06 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20040603020634/http://
www.google.com/corporate/tenthings.html) (‘“Google may be the only company
in the world whose stated goal is to have users leave its website as quickly as
possible.’”).
29. Our Philosophy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/corporate
/company/tenthings.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (discussing Google’s core
goals, including its desire for fast web searches).
30. “I’m Feeling Lucky,” GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/support
/websearch/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=30735 (last visited Oct. 9, 2011)
(describing the “I’m Feeling Lucky” button).
31. Nicholas Carlson, “I’m Feeling Lucky” Button Costs Google $110 Million Per
Year, GAWKER (Nov. 20, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/tech
/google/im-feeling-lucky-button-costs-google-110-million-per-year-324927.php
(discussing the high costs of the “I’m Feeling Lucky” button).
32. For a complete list of search features, see Google Search Features, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/help/features.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (listing the
features of a Google search).
33. See Goldman, supra note 28.
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commercial value from having searchers referred to their websites.
Not surprisingly, some third-party websites are unhappy that
Google shows so much indexed information on its own pages.
34
“Google Places” pages have been the subject of a particularly
public brawl between Google and the websites it indexes. The
Places pages compile both objective and subjective content about
individual businesses into a single Google page. The indexed
websites contributing such content—including most prominently
TripAdvisor and Yelp—have loudly complained that Google shows
35
too much of “their” content, such that consumers are less likely to
click through to their websites. As the indexed websites have
36
pushed back on Google, in some cases, Google has honored their
37
requests.
Second, over the past half-dozen years, Google has expanded
38
the number and scope of content services that it owns, such as its
34. John Hanke, Introducing Google Places, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Apr.
20, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/04/introducinggoogle-places.html (providing an overview of Google Places).
35. Pamela Parker, Review Sites’ Rancor Rises with Prominence of Google Place
Pages, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Jan. 31, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://searchengineland.com
/review-sites-rancor-rises-with-prominence-of-google-place-pages-62980 (discussing
that sites like TripAdvisor and Yelp have complained that Google Places gives away
too much information to web searchers).
36. Amir Efrati, Rivals Say Google Plays Favorites, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870405870457601563018856897
2.html; Amir Efrati, TripAdvisor Says Google Won’t Stop Using Its Content, WALL ST. J.
DIGITS (Jan. 21, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/01/21
/standoff-continues-between-google-other-sites; Greg Sterling, TripAdvisor Blocks
Google: The Start of a Larger Trend?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Dec. 9, 2010, 9:31 AM),
http://searchengineland.com/tripadvisor-blocks-google-the-start-of-a-larger-trend58280 (noting that travel sites are preventing Google Places from showing their
reviews).
37. Greg Sterling, Yelp Unlikely to Come Back to Google Places, SEARCH ENGINE
LAND (Aug. 26, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://searchengineland.com/yelp-not-comingback-to-google-places-49430 (stating that Google agreed to remove Yelp’s content
from Google Places). In July 2011, Google removed all third-party reviews from its
Places pages. Erick Schonfeld, Google Places Stops Stealing Reviews, TECHCRUNCH
(July 21, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/21/google-places-stops-stealingreviews (noting that Google Places links to third-party sites instead of showing
those sites’ reviews).
38. It is also worth noting that Google has massively expanded its non-search
offerings, including its free wi-fi service in Mountain View, California, Welcome to
Free WiFi Access for Mountain View, GOOGLE (Sept. 4, 2011), http://wifi.google.com,
email services through Gmail, the Android operating system, the Google Chrome
web browser, software applications in Google Docs, Google Desktop’s hard drive
indexing, and telephone calls through Google Voice. Everything Google, GOOGLE
(Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/products (linking to all
of Google’s products).
Google’s purchase of Zagat is another sign that Google plans to own more of its
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39

2006 purchase of YouTube. As a result, Google increasingly may
want to showcase its offerings at the expense of promoting third40
party websites that compete with Google-owned properties.
Overall, Google used to view itself as a facilitator between
searchers and the rest of the web. Google has evolved into a portal
that wants to keep searchers within its offerings. This portalization
potentially creates some tension between self-promoting Google’s
own offerings and providing an optimal searcher experience when
that would include showcasing third-party offerings.
D. “Net Neutrality” and “Search Neutrality”
“Net neutrality” is an amorphous and complicated term.
Usually, it refers to the nondiscriminatory transmission of data
41
Net neutrality became a
packets irrespective of their contents.
red-hot topic in the second half of the first decade of the twentyfirst century as telecommunications giants and major content
owners engaged in a complex, multi-front battle over money,
42
power, operational freedom, and freedom of speech.
43
Google publicly participated in the net neutrality debates and
proclaimed that it “has been the leading corporate voice on the
44
Google’s
issue of network neutrality over the past five years.”
own content in the future. Marissa Meyer, Google Just Got ZAGAT Rated, THE
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 08:27:00 AM), http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/google-just-got-zagat-rated.html.
39. Google Closes Acquisition of YouTube, GOOGLE (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/youtube.html.
40. See Editorial, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15thu3.html; Eric Goldman, The
Problems with Google House Ads, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Aug. 18, 2010, 1:00 PM),
http://searchengineland.com/the-problems-with-googles-house-ads-48325 (noting
that Google uses house ads that auction ad space on Google’s network).
41. There are many definitions of Net Neutrality. See Network Neutrality,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_neutrality#Definitions_of
_network_neutrality (last updated Oct. 1, 2011).
42. See Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality:
Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 No. 6 J. INTERNET L. 1, 11 (2008). The
authors explain that in the highly publicized debate over net neutrality, “the battle
lines have been drawn between large telecommunications companies that own the
pipes, on one side, and Internet content companies and public interest groups on
the other.” Id.
43. See Eric Schmidt, A Note to Google Users on Net Neutrality, GOOGLE (Summer
2006), http://www.google.com/help/netneutrality_letter.html (encouraging
Google users to get involved in the net neutrality debate by voicing concerns to
their Representatives).
44. Richard Whitt, Facts About Our Network Neutrality Policy Proposal, GOOGLE
PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 12, 2010, 1:46 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy
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unsuccessful bid in the 700MHz spectrum auction prompted the
FCC to impose some neutrality conditions on the successful
45
bidders, and it jointly announced with Verizon “a suggested
legislative framework for consideration by lawmakers” for net
46
neutrality.
Google’s demands for neutrality on Internet connectivity stand
in stark contrast to its tight editorial control over its search
operations—editorial discretion that Google has steadfastly
47
Needless to say, Google’s superficially duplicitous
defended.
position has not gone unnoticed.
For example, in 2006,
Representative Charles Gonzalez proposed legislation that would
48
prohibit search engines from engaging in discrimination.
In general, charges of Google hypocrisy reflect a
misunderstanding
about the
various “layers” in the
telecommunications stack (i.e., the physical layer plays a different
role in the information ecosystem than the content layer), which
means the exercise of editorial control at the different layers has
49
very different effects on consumers. Nevertheless, asserting that
Google is hypocritical makes for a nifty sound bite.
Attacks on Google’s alleged hypocrisy have popularized a new
50
Search neutrality is the inverse of
term, “search neutrality.”
.blogspot.com/2010/08/facts-about-our-network-neutrality.html.
45. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FCC Revises 700 MHz Rules to
Advance Interoperable Public Safety Communications and Promote Wireless
Broadband Deployment (July 31, 2007), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov
/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-275669A1.pdf; Brian Gardiner, Google Calls 700MHz Auction a Major Victory for Consumers, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2008, 4:43 PM),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/03/google-calls-70
(explaining
that
Google’s unsuccessful bid “lock[ed] in the open access rules”).
46. Alan Davidson & Tom Tauke, A Joint Policy Proposal for an Open Internet,
GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 9, 2010, 1:38 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy
.blogspot.com/2010/08/joint-policy-proposal-for-open-internet.html.
47. See, e.g., Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS),
2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech.,
Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
48. See Declan McCullagh, New Net Neutrality Plan May Ruffle Feathers, CNET
NEWS (June 8, 2006, 6:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-6081887.html.
49. See Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 179, 202 (2009). See generally Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for
Internet Policy, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002). The “layers” model
generally traces its lineage to the “Open Systems Interconnection” (OSI),
developed in the 1980s by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO). Id. at 59.
50. See Nate Anderson, Search Neutrality? How Google Became a “Neutrality”
Target, ARS TECHNICA L. & DISORDER, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news
/2010/04/search-neutrality-google-becomes-neutraliy.ars (last visited Aug. 28,
2011) (tracing the etymology of the term).
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51

search engine bias (i.e., neutrality implies a lack of bias). Because
so much attention has been paid to net neutrality, the analogous
term “search neutrality” has eclipsed “search engine bias” as the
appellation of choice.
The vernacular shift from “search engine bias” to “search
neutrality” creates three interrelated problems. First, it invites an
apples-to-oranges comparison between net neutrality and search
neutrality, even though they address different issues.
Second, given that no one can agree on net neutrality’s
definition, importing its semantic ambiguity into the search engine
bias debate hardly improves the discourse.
Third, the term “search neutrality” implies the existence of
neutral search engines, but those are entirely mythical. Every
search engine design choice necessarily and unavoidably reflects
52
Thus, the term “search neutrality” implies a
normative values.
53
Platonic ideal of a search engine that cannot be achieved.
Naturally, then, Google’s practices fail to conform to this Platonic
54
ideal, but so does every other search engine in the real world.
III. THE END OF RATIONAL DISCUSSION ABOUT SEARCH ENGINE BIAS
Google’s dominance of the search engine industry distorts the
discussion about search engine bias in other unfortunate ways.
55
Google has made a lot of enemies on its way to the top, and many
of them are willing to use legal tools to degrade Google’s
competitive position. Some of the anti-Google forces are advancing
positions that may help tweak Google in the short term, but could
ironically conflict with their long-term interests.
51. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer,
What’s the Question?, INT’L CENTER FOR L. & ECON. 3 (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://laweconcenter.org/images/articles/search_neutrality_manne_wright_final
.pdf (explaining that the term “search neutrality” is increasingly used by scholars,
regulators, and policymakers as a remedy for “search engine bias”).
52. See Goldman, supra note 2, passim.
53. James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435 (Berin Szoka & Adam
Marcus eds. 2010) (requiring search engines to act neutrally makes users more
vulnerable to unwanted search results).
54. See Danny Sullivan, The Incredible Stupidity of Investigating Google for Acting
Like a Search Engine, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 30, 2010, 7:52 AM),
http://searchengineland.com/the-incredible-stupidity-of-investigating-google-foracting-like-a-search-engine-57268.
55. Jay Greene, Google’s Enemy List, a Primer, CNET NEWS (June 24, 2011, 2:25
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-20074178-93
/googles-enemy-list-a-primer.
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Microsoft—who learned a lot about antitrust law from its
decade-long antitrust defense—has actively marshaled forces
against Google, including spurring efforts to increase the
56
regulation of search engines. Should those efforts succeed,
Microsoft’s own search engine, Bing, ought to be subject to
the regulations as well. Thus, Microsoft-instigated regulatory
intervention could ultimately hamper Bing’s freedom to
operate.
A number of other intermediaries fear that Google will
disintermediate them.
As discussed earlier, Yelp and
57
In
TripAdvisor have fought back against Google Places.
response to Google’s proposed acquisition of ITA, a group of
travel aggregators and others put together an advocacy group
58
Hypocritically, some
misleadingly named “FairSearch.org.”
FairSearch members freely engage in the kind of search
59
Should
manipulation that they fear Google will practice.
FairSearch succeed in instantiating its stated objectives, its
members might be surprised to find their own operations
adversely affected.
As part of their death spiral, newspapers have lashed out
against Google because they mistakenly believe Google
(especially Google News) unfairly appropriates economic
value from them. Indeed, some major newspapers—including
60
the New York Times —have published editorials calling for
regulation of Google’s search engine bias. Yet, for centuries,
newspapers have engaged in their own form of editorial bias
61
that is no more transparent than Google’s; and for decades,

56. See, e.g., Hettena, supra note 15; Dave Heiner, Competition Authorities and
Search, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Feb. 26, 2010, 11:57 AM),
http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2010/02/26/com
petition-authorities-and-search.aspx.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37.
58. FAIRSEARCH, http://www.fairsearch.org (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
59. Eric Goldman, Hypocrisy Alert?! Expedia, a “FairSearch” Member, Marginalizes
American Airlines in Its Search Results, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 30, 2010,
1:52 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/12/hypocrisy_alert.htm
(alleging that Expedia, a member of FairSearch, disregarded the alliance’s
principles without repercussion by downgrading American Airlines in its search
results).
60. Editorial, supra note 40 (“[T]he potential impact of Google’s algorithm
on the Internet economy is such that it is worth exploring ways to ensure that the
editorial policy guiding Google’s tweaks is solely intended to improve the quality
of the results and not to help Google’s other businesses.”).
61. Danny Sullivan, The New York Times Algorithm & Why It Needs Government
Regulation, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (July 15, 2010, 2:07 PM), http://
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62

many newspapers have been local monopolists with zero
63
accountability for any abuse of their editorial position. It is
shamefully hypocritical for newspapers—historically the
strongest champion of publishers’ editorial freedom—to
advocate against Google’s editorial freedom because the
newspapers distrust how Google uses it.
As these examples indicate, truly “neutral” perspectives about
search engine bias are increasingly rare. Instead, competitive
jostling has overtaken much of the discussion. Given the huge
economic stakes associated with the search engine industry, it has
become almost impossible to distinguish legitimate discourse from
economic rent-seeking.
Amazingly, despite all of this competitive gunning for Google,
there is still no strong evidence (or, in my opinion, persuasive
evidence) that (1) Google has used illegitimate practices to
advance or maintain its industry dominance, or (2) consumers
cannot or will not gravitate to the most effective online search tools
available to them. Without such evidence, it remains equally
plausible that the search engine marketplace continues to function
well, and searchers continue to vote with their mice. It just so
happens that many of those votes are for Google.
In the rare recent discussions about search engine bias not
driven by economic gamesmanship, the discussion often considers
whether regulators (or plaintiffs) can “improve” search engine
results compared to the results search engines produce guided by
64
It can be tempting to believe that an
marketplace forces.
omniscient regulator can improve search engines, but I favor a
clear justification before we indulge this censorious temptation.
Objectively, we are blessed with historically unprecedented free

searchengineland.com/regulating-the-new-york-times-46521 (“Compared to the
New York Times, Google’s a model of transparency.”).
62. See Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
63. Cf. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding
that, due to the Constitution, newspapers cannot be obligated to offer a right of
reply).
64. Although surveys like this usually turn on a question’s exact wording,
according to a Rasmussen survey, “77% of Adults say there is no need for
government regulation of the way that search engines select the recommendations
they provide in response to search inquiries. Just 11% believe such regulation is
necessary . . . .” Most Say No to Government Regulation of Search Engines, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/
lifestyle/general_lifestyle/january_2011/most_say_no_to_government_regulation
_of_search_engines.
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65

search tools that help create enormous social value. It would be
easy for regulators, even well-intentioned ones, to inadvertently
eliminate some of this value through misregulation. That outcome
is worth fighting against.

65. Kevin Kelly, Would You Pay for Search?, THE TECHNIUM (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.kk.org/thetechnium/archives/2011/04/would_you_pay_f.php
(“[T]he value of free search works out to around $500 per year.”).
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